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The Deregulation of Industry:
How Far Should We Go?
WEsLEY J. LIEBELER*
We have been asked to address the question of the extent to which
the government should get out of the business of "regulating" private
firms. More specifically, we have been told that we need a theory, if
substantial deregulation is to occur, to tell us when and to what extent
such deregulation should take place. We have also been asked to polder
whether or not that is the same question as what justifies regulation in
the first place, i.e., does the fact that there is an existing system of rega-
lation in place in any particular industry pose distinct problems?
I propose that we apply to the first two of these questions the tech-
niques of zero-base budgeting, a system which appears to be coming ihto
increasing use among private firms. It requires managers to justify-all
future expenditures on the assumption that all of their existing pro-
grams'are nonexistent. It is probably not very popular among those who
are required to respond to its demands for it requires more than the
pleasures*of justifying an expansion of our empires. It actually purports
to require us to justify our existing empires.
In applying a zero-base budget approach to various schemes of
government regulation we ask, first, why do we have this regulation
at all? The clear implication of this approach is that the regulation will
be halted, nzo funds will be forthcoming for its continued operation,
unless it can be "justified" in some way.
The concept of justification implies a standard of measurement. In
the private firm that standard is, presumably at least, contribution to
profit. This is another way of saying, it is worth noting, that the firm
is able to sell the output of the particular operation being considered to
others who are willing to pay more than (or at least as much as) it costs
to produce the output in question.
Thus, the justification of private investment is based ultimately on
the willingness of others to give up part of their wealth in, for the
*Professor of Law, U.C.LA.
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most part uncoerced,1 market transactions in exchange for the output
in question.
This is a profoundly legitimizing justification-one that depends
on the more or less continuing assent of the parties to the transaction.
We can get stung, of course, and sometimes we do. We are not, how-
ever, as a general proposition, required to come back for more.
In a very gross way similar considerations are sometimes involved
in our relationships with the state, as those "governing" the City of
New York have the opportunity to learn. They are involved only
grossly, however, and their effects diminish sharply as the scope of the
governmental unit involved increases. The transaction costs of leaving
the United States for more congenial atmospheres, for example, are
high indeed. They are so high that for present purposes at any rate,
we may safely ignore the direct effect of market forces on government
behavior.
It is becoming increasingly recognized, however, that market an-
alysis does provide a powerful tool in judging when government activity
may be appropriate. While it may be less recognized, it is also true that
market analysis can contribute greatly to the next question: What kind
of government activity is best suited to solve the problem which we
have concluded is of such nature and magnitude as to justify govern-
ment intervention in the first place?
The market analysis approach to judging the necessity and/or form
of government activity is based on the proposition that the well-being
of consumers is highest in the context of an effectively operating free
market. The efficiency of the market is a proposition that is generally
accepted among economists and on which very large parts (if not most)
of American public policy is based. This wide regard for the efficacy of
markets is attested by the fact that even the most ill-conceived gov-
ernment programs are justified (or accompanied) by claims that in any
particular area the market, left to itself, simply cannot handle the
problem.
A significant number of such claims are window dressing. It is
true, nonetheless, that there are times when the market, for various
reasons, does not do very well. It is becoming popular to refer to those
situations in which the market does not do very well as cases of market
failure.'
1 At this point the issues of fraud, misrepresentation, etc., are omitted.
2 Professor Coase has used the concept of "market failure?' to explain why firms
come into existence, i.e., why aU transactions are not conducted in the market. Coase,
The Nature of the Firm, in RADImNGS iN PRicE THEORY 334 (Stigler and Bouldings eds.
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There are lots of problems with the term "market failure." Per-
haps it should not be used at all. It has a quality about it that will, I
predict, captivate lawyers and other public policy types. Its lack of pre-
cise meaning may make it as popular as "barriers to entry" and other
similar terms that serve as substitutes for thought in the antitrust field.
I shall, however, use it as a general expression which must be made more
specific before it can be regarded as operational in particular instances.
During the past year the Office of Policy Planning at the FTC has
attempted to utilize the concept of market failure in evaluating the work
of the Bureau of Consumer Protection. The Planning Office has devel-
oped a series of questions in this regard that may be relevant to broader
issues of government regulation than those involved in the work of the
Bureau of Consumer Protection. More specifically, I believe those ques-
tions may be useful in providing a structure within which to analyze
the utility of government regulation in general.
These questions, as developed for use within the FTC, are:
(1) Has the market failed to operate as regards the matter at
hand?
(2) If it is claimed that it has, in what respects has it failed and
what are the reasons for such alleged failure?
(3) Are the remedies proposed addressed to the respects in which
the market has been alleged to have failed?
(4) What is the likelihood that the proposed remedies will cor-
rect the specified failures of the market so as to improve consumer
welfare?
(5) What are the approximate dollar benefits in terms of im-
proved consumer welfare that might reasonably be expected to flow
from the proposed remedies?
(6) What are the costs involved in implementing the proposed
remedies?
These questions are not very interesting unless we can say some-
thing specific about the nature of "market failure." Perhaps the most
commonly accepted approach to the question is in terms of transaction
1952). To say that market failure exists is simply to say that the costs of conducting
particular kinds of transactions across markets exceeds the gains realizable from those
transactions. Those costs may be reduced by organizing the transactions within a firm or,
possibly, through the involvement of the government. See WLmmsoN, MARErrs AmD
Hx xcmiFs: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUsT b.PLIcATIoNs (1975); Williamson, The &co-
nomics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Considerations, 122 U. PA. L. Rav. 1439
(1974); Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Con-
siderations, 61 Am. Ecor. Rav. 112 (May 1971); Liebeler, Integration and Competition, in
VzrsicAx INTRURAnoir er Ta OI. INDusTRY 5 (Mitchell ed. 1976).
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costs. The transaction cost approach has interesting implications in terms
of property rights theory, which is also an important consideration in
thinking about the appropriateness of various kinds of government
activity, or the appropriateness of any kind of government activity in
the particular circumstances under consideration. It is in fact quite use-
ful to think of property rights as a device for reducing transaction
costs, or for providing a means of internalizing the costs and benefits
of market transactions.
It may be useful to go through the questions that I have listed
above and substitute the ideas of external costs and benefits wherever
market failure is mentioned. Or we might substitute the notion of "high"
transaction costs, which is the basic reason for the existence of exter-
nalities in the first place. In the absence of "high" transaction costs,
parties related to each other in the production and consumption of ex-
ternal costs and benefits would find it profitable to engage in market
transactions that would bring such externalities to an end.'
If such externalities did not exist to any significant degree, it is
hard to imagine any justification whatever for direct government regu-
lation, or even for most indirect forms of government regulation. If it
is the presence of significant externalities that justifies collective action
(government intervention), then it seems to follow that the purpose, and
thereby the structure or nature, of government regulation, is to get rid
of the externalities, i.e., to bring about, in so far as possible, that state
of affairs which would exist but for the externalities. That state of
affairs, of course, is that which would exist if persons were able to
enter into exchange transactions without being constrained by these
supposedly intractible transaction costs. That state of affairs, obviously,
is the one which would exist in a zero-transaction-cost market. And in
this conclusion lies the justification for my previous claim that market
analysis provides a powerful tool for judging the question of when
government action may be appropriate and, when we conclude that it
is appropriate, for judging the question of what kind of government
action is best suited to the end at hand.
Under this formulation, I would suggest that government action
is appropriate when the gains it may realistically be expected to produce,
in terms of increasing the well-being of persons who would engage in
exchange transactions but for the presence of transaction costs that ex-
ceed the value to be obtained from such exchanges, are greater than
S3See generally TnE ECONOICS op LEOAL RELATIONSmPS: READINGS IN TnE T oRy
or PROPERTY RIGHTS (Manne ed. 1975).
4 See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW. E oN. 1 (1960).
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the costs attendant upon such government action.5 This formulation (my
third question) also suggests that government action should be aimed
at reducing transaction costs, i.e., at facilitating exchanges. If this is
true, serious questions are raised about the appropriateness of govern-
ment regulation which prevents exchanges, as much, if not most of
existing regulation does.
Let me develop these ideas more specifically in the context of the
regulation of prescription drugs by the FDA and in the context of the
activities of the FCC. I will then have some comments on the third
question which we have been asked to address: Does the fact that there
is an existing system of regulation in place change any of the basic
issues?
To apply the approach which I have suggested to the prescription
drug market, by analogy to the zero-based budget system, I assume
the total absence of FDA regulation. It is difficult to apply my first
question: "Has the marked failed to operate as regards the matter at
hand?" in quite those terms because the market at hand has been the
subject of pervasive government regulation for such a long period of
time. I will modify my first question slightly and ask, instead, whether
there is anything about this market that we could expect to cause
market failue in the absence of FDA-type regulation.
In answering this question, which we have noted translates readily
into a search for siguificant externalities, it will be useful to refer to
some recent developments in the field of information theory. Important
contributions have been made by Philip Nelson of the State University
of New York6 and, of more particular interest to the present discussion,
by Michael Darby of UCLA.7
Their work suggests the existence of three different qualities in
goods or services, defined primarily in terms of the most cost effective
ways in which consumers can obtain information about those qualities.
These three different qualities are:
(1) Search qualities, those the salient characteristics of which can
be ascertained by search or observation prior to the time of purchase.
Examples would include the style of a dress, the ripeness of a banana, or
the price of either.
5 This formulation assumes that the government action being considered does not
impose external costs on others, an assumption that may be dubious in some cases.
05See Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. PoL. Eco '. 311 (1970).




(2) Experience qudities, as to which experience or trial is the
most effective source of information. Examples would include the taste
of a can of tuna fish or a can of beer, the efficacy of a particular laundry
detergent, an underarm deodorant, or the like.
(3) Credence qualities, as to which reasonably well-informed
judgments cannot be made, either before or after purchase, without
obtaining additional costly information. Automobile, television, and
human body repair are examples. Darby suggests, as an example of
a credence quality, the claimed advantages of the removal of an ap-
pendix, which will be correct or not according to whether the organ
is diseased. The purchaser, however, will have no different experience
after the operation no matter what the condition of his appendix might
have been.
Prescription drugs are heavily laden with credence qualities, so
much so that we may refer to them simply as credence goods. We are
not able to learn much of importance by looking at them, for example,
nor are we willing to respond with alacrity to the imprecation "Try it,
you'll like it." In order to make intelligent decisions as to the use of
prescription drugs, both consumers and prescribers need to have addi-
tional information which is not free.8 But since such information is not
free, we go on to ask what would be, given the absence of FDA regula-
tion, a likely source of such information?9
A firm or firms could arise in the market to produce and sell this
type of information. We do not observe much of this, however, largely,
it is argued, because of the form of market failure that is associated
with the high transaction costs involved in policing the use of whatever
information our hypothetical firm may produce. The first purchaser
of such information can pass it on to others without reducing its
8 f such information were free, there would obviously be no need for FDA-type or
other government regulation of this market. Each consumer (or prescriber) could com-
pare the available information with his own (or his patient's) utility function and make
the correct (optimal) decision each time. This is simply the other side of the coin that
government intervention is justified by a comparison of its costs and benefits in the
context of clearly identified market failure (here high transaction costs).
9 The above formulation implies that FDA regulation is a way of providing informa-
tion. It is that, of course. This may be seen most clearly in those cases in which FDA
has approved a drug for one use but not another. The drug is now available in the
market for the first, approved use. As a result, the most obviously coercive form of FDA
activity, keeping a drug off the market, is not present. But even though the drug is
physically available at the corner drug store, I suspect that not much of it will be used
for the unapproved purpose. If that is in fact the case, one reason may be the implicit
information carried in the fact of nonapproval for that use by FDA.
But FDA regulation is more than a way of providing information. The power to keep
drugs off the market includes the power to prevent advantageous exchanges that would
otherwise be made, even in the absence of anything like perfect information, between
buyers and sellers of drugs.
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value to himself. This makes it extremely difficult for the producer
of information to recover the costs of its production. If those costs
cannot be recovered, the information will not be produced. These con-
siderations explain why most information about products is supplied
by the makers of these products. They are able to recover the cost of
creating and supplying this information in the price of the product to
which that information relates.'0
This "tying" arrangement enables the manufacturer to internalize
the benefits of the information and thereby insures its continued pro-
duction. But it also skews the incentives to produce accurate and
truthful information, particularly where, as in the case of credence goods,
consumers have great difficulty in evaluating those characteristics. In
short, the maker of the product may have an incentive to provide only
that information that will help to sell the product, even if it is not
accurate, true, or complete.
Let us now go back to the first question as modified to fit this
market: Is there anything about the prescription drug market that we
could expect to cause market failure in the absence of FDA-type regula-
tion? The discussion suggests that to the extent that it is not possible
(i.e., very costly) to internalize the benefits of producing information
as to credence qualities so as to recover the costs of its production
without badly skewing the incentives to accuracy and truthfulness,
we may conclude that we are hot on the trail of something that might be
called a market failure.
The chase is not over yet, however. Private action may still be
equal to the event. And if it is not, satisfactory results may be obtained
without getting into direct government regulation at all, such as
through appropriate doctrines of tort law.
The private reaction to "market failure" of the type I have de-
scribed above is integration of some kind, i.e., the formation of a firm
either through ownership arrangements or by contract. If X, or X
and a group of like drug consumers, were vertically integrated into
drug production, I suspect that they could solve the problems outlined
above in short order. They would issue instructions to the management
of their manufacturing subsidiary to produce the kind and amount of
information that the owner/consumers wanted and they would fire
them if they failed to heed those advices.
10Liebeler, Integration and Competition, in VERICAL. INTWRAToN IN THE OML IN-
Dusrmz 5, 10 (Mitchell ed. 1976).
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Of course, we need not actually integrate into the production of
drugs. It is, after all, information that we are after. A horizontal
integration (a co-operative) of drug consumers could be formed to
pay drug manufacturers to produce this information, which would
then be shared among the members of the co-operative. The transac-
tion costs of such organization are surely not insurmountable. In fact,
we are told by no less a personage than J.K. Galbraith, albeit at a time
when he at least purported to write about the subject of economics, that
co-operative organization" is an important aspect of economic life in
some parts of the world. It surely is not in the United States, a fact
which suggests that at least some information is produced in other
ways, thereby reducing the benefits to be obtained from consumer
integration into the information market to a point below the cost of
doing so.
FDA regulation itself is certainly one factor in this information
production system. Most of us know that the agency is out there doing
something, apparently keeping drugs off the market that would be
available under more benign conditions."2 This piece of information, along
with the standards of efficacy and safety which are used as a basis for
approving drugs, certainly reduces the gains available from the private
production of information. The problem, of course, is that the FDA
system of regulation imposes substantial costs of a different sort.'
Another source of information is the reputation of the manu-
facturer and the more detailed information on particular drug use and
side-effects provided by particular manufacturers, the value of which
is based in large part on that reputation. If consumers placed a high
value on (i.e., were willing to pay for) complete, accurate, and truth-
ful information on prescription drugs, we would expect to find firms at-
tempting to respond to this demand.
This response would entail the construction of reputations for the
desired characteristics. The construction of these reputations by firms
should be regarded as a form of forward vertical integration into
11 J. GABAarm, AMiCAN CAPiTALISM 125 (1950).1 2 PLTdzfiA, REGu.LATION OF PIARmACEnTICAL INNOVATION: Tnn 1962 A=nmmENms
(1974); Grabowski, Vernon & Thomas, The Effects of Regulatory Policy on the Incentives
to Innovate: An International Comparative Analysis, in ImPACr oF PUBLIC PoLicr ON DrmU
INNOVATION AND PRicNO 47 (Mitchell & Link eds. 1976).
18 The FDA's efforts to keep Laetrile off the domestic market as a cancer treatment
are classic in this respect. It is attempting to prevent the importation of the drug from
Mexico by patients who have been advised of all known relevant facts by their physi-
cians. See Los Angeles Times, Jan. 9, 1976, at 32; Liebeler, Critique of Crout, New
Drug Regulation and its Impact on Innovation, in IiPAcr oF PUBLIC Poucv ON DRUG
INNOVATION AND PICImr 267 (Mitchell & Link eds. 1976).
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information supply and, as such, a substitute for backward vertical
integration by consumers, the absence of which we have noted.14
In estimating the reliability of information supplied in this way by
manufacturers, we note that the construction of good reputation is a
costly business; the destruction of such a reputation comes much easier.
Because of the costly nature of good reputations, they will probably
not be readily frittered away through the provisions of information that
does not accord with that which one would expect based on the reputa-
tion. As to manufacturers with these highly developed, costly reputa-
tions, it may well be that my previous conclusion that the maker of a
product has an incentive to provide only that information that will help
sell the product, even if it is not accurate, truthful or complete, does
not hold.1 5
All of this goes to the question of whether or not the market
really has "failed." It may very well not have; the gains available from
government involvement may not exceed the costs. The question of
whether and when markets have "failed" in particular cases is a ques-
tion on which persons, at least one of whom is reasonable, can and
surely will disagree. I am not particularly interested right now in whethe
or not the prescription drug market would "really" fail absent FDA-
type regulation. I am interested in outlining an approach to; and a way
of thinking about, the question of when government regulation may
make sense and, when we conclude that it does, what kind is best
suited to solve the problem at hand.
So let us assume for purposes of discussion that we have identified
a case of significant market failure, and let us pass over the question of
whether or not it could effectively be treated by modifications in the
law of torts or in other indirect ways. That brings us to our third
question, to which the immediately preceding discussion also relates.
That question, modified slightly to fit into our discussion of the drug
market, is: What remedy (or regulation) is most appropriately addressed
to the respects in which we have concluded (here assumed) that the
market has failed?
The answer to this question is, obviously and happily, a direct
function of the market failure that we have identified or assumed. The
14 See Liebeler, Integration and Competition, supra note 2.
15 Or it may be that such firms are selling a different product than that which is
being sold by their less highly regarded fellows. They may be selling drugs plus informa-
tion, which in the hands of consumers gives the drugs a higher -value than the perhaps
similar (or identical) drugs being produced by firms which have not developed such a
subsubstantial reputation for goodness.
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most appropriate regulation is that which will most effectively deal
with our market failure.
Since the market failure assumed in this case involves the unavail-
ability of appropriate information, government intervention should be
designed to facilitate (or provide for) the delivery of such informa-
tion. This could, of course, be done indirectly, for example by alter-
ing the "duties" of manufacturers under tort law. But we have resolved
to pass this issue for the moment.
It could also be done directly. The government could become a
collector, distributor, and, if absolutely necessary, a producer of in-
formation. It could, for example, report the results of any tests which
had been performed, either in the United States or elsewhere, regard-
ing any particular drug, experience with the drug during use in other
countries and, of particular importance, user experience in the United
States, with particular attention being paid to adverse reactions, if any.
If information such as this is readily available to doctors and to
their patients why will they not be able to make decisions as to drug use
that are appropriate to their own notions of their own good? I think
that they would be able to do so, but I can appreciate the fact that not
everyone will agree with me-immediately. When I outlined these ideas
the other day at a conference on drug regulation, a well-known former
general counsel for FDA told me that while it was an elegant scheme, it
simply would not work.16 In anticipation of the possibility that others
may be similarly guided, let me comment briefly on the reasons why
they would be wrong.
It will no doubt be objected that information of the type that I
have described will be voluminous, highly technical, and unintelligible to
all patients and to most doctors. It may also be put that I can not
expect patients (or doctors) to read what amounts to a prospectus be-
fore consenting to, or prescribing, a penicillin injection or some similar
treament. I think that both propositions are undoubtedly correct.
They are also not very interesting and imply a rather naive view of
how information travels. What doctor (or patient) now cares whether
or not penicillin was ever approved by the FDA, or that it may have
been approved under less rigorous standards than are applicable now?
Not very many, I would venture to guess. For the word "penicillin",
or perhaps some brand name therefor associated with a particular manu-
facturer, carries a message that is equal to most events. Why? Because
16 Liebeler, supra note 13, at 269-70.
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of the reputation that the drug has built up, a reputation based on
countless experiences that both doctors and patients have had with it.
The same thing would be true of many, if not most or all, other
drugs that are currently in use in this country. As to them the burden of
informing oneself should not be any greater if FDA were to disappear
this afternoon. The real differences between the information system
that I have proposed and the present system would occur at the point
where new drugs either come onto the market or they do not, and with
regard to those drugs that have not been in widespread use long enough
to have provided complete information on adverse reactions, and to
have gained reputations as to their efficacy and adverse reaction cre-
ating potential.
As to these two points of significance, it is not clear that a system
which emphasizes the collection and dissemination of relevant informa-
tion and which permits fully informed doctors and patients to assume
the risks of using these newer drugs is inferior to the existing system,
which does not collect and handle information very well and which pre-
vents the exercise of such informed individual choice. It is not, to put
it mildly, clear at all.
But this gets us into an estimate of the costs and benefits and the
effectiveness of various proposed schemes of regulation or non-
regulation. These are the subjects addressed by questions 4-6. While
they are of great importance, they are obviously beyond the scope of
the present discussion. Suffice it to say that the present system costs
plenty in terms of governmental and private resources required for its
continued operation. And that expenditure, at least on the basis of
the work done by Peltzman and Wardell, is producing negative bene-
fits for our society." Such a system, like a great deal of current govern-
ment regulation, has little to recommend it.
The FCC presents a much simpler problem. The invention of
radio and later of television created a new resource of great value but
in which no rights of private property had ever been developed." The
Federal Radio Commission and later the FCC did develop a system
of property rights in the new resource, but they have never become fully
private. These property rights, i.e., the "authority" to broadcast during
certain times at certain strengths and frequencies, are subject to periodic
renewal and can in effect be taken (or continued use by a particular
party forbidden) by the government. Just as the FCC "created" these
17See authorities cited note 12 supra; W. WARDELL & L. LASAGNA, REGULATION
AND DRuG DEVELOPUMNT (1975).
I8 Coase, The Federal Communicalos Commission, 2 J. LAw. EcoN. 1 (1959).
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property rights, it also in effect protects them from encroachment by
others by policing the use of the authority which it has granted to other
broadcasters, and by preventing broadcasting without authority.
It seems clear that we had a case of market failure prior to the
time the FCC created the present licensing system. Just as with the
beavers in Demsetz's study of the development of property rights among
the Indians,19 there was no incentive to build up a clientele on any par-
ticular frequency because the policing costs of preventing others from
free-riding on that effort were very high. That market failure, how-
ever, could readily be cured by developing a system of property rights
in radio and television frequencies and authorizing the common-law
court system to enforce such rights. The creation of such a system
of enforceable property rights would reduce the transaction costs of
policing to quite manageable levels and, at least on the surface of things,
do away with the need for further or more direct government interven-
tion.
We all know that it was not done this way. Instead we have the
FCC. Let us suppose, however, that all of the presently outstanding
operating rights were auctioned to the highest bidders or simply given
to their present holders in fee and federal courts were authorized to
enjoin any interference with and otherwise to protect such property
rights.20 Let us now apply the zero-base budget technique to the FCC and
ask what other functions it performs that could be offered in justifica-
tion of its continued existence.
It does not regulate the telephone companies with any great distinc-
tion. It does, it is said, greatly inhibit the development of cable television
systems, much to the benefit of the existing networks, but of more
dubious value to society as a whole. It may be that I am missing some-
thing of value in its work. But in the absence of such a showing, I see
no reason why existing operating rights should not be transformed into
private property rights in some appropriate way and the employees of
the FCC be invited to engage in more socially useful activities.
As I have said, this is not a new idea. It has been rather ex-
tensively treated by others. And yet, to my knowledge, it has not
recommended itself even to those benighted apologists of the market
system who have found refuge in the current administration. Why not?
19 Demsetz, Toward A Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. EcoN. REv. PRM
347 (1967), reprinted in TnE ECONOMiCS or LwAL RELAioNS Is, supra note 3, at 23.20 See DeVany, Eckert, Meyers, OHaxa & Scott, A Property System for Market Allo-
cation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 SrAsr.
L. REv. 1499 (1969).
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This brings me to the final question: Does the fact that there is
an existing scheme of regulation in existence pose problems distinct
from those involved in the question of whether or not to institute
regulation in the first place? I think the answer to this question de-
pends on whether we are talking about efficiency considerations, as in
this discussion, or whether our concern is with equity or income distribu-
tion questions. While the latter are certainly important from a political
standpoint, they do not raise any interesting theoretical questions and
from the point of view of society as a whole, they ought not to be re-
garded as important even from a political point of view.
The problem is, however, that many regulatory schemes have re-
distributed income, usually away from consumers into the hands of
groups of producers. In at least some cases the benefited producers have
competed away these golden eggs, apparently because of the great
difficulty involved in effectively colluding even with the help of the
government. In the airline industry, for example, this competition has
taken the form of more frequent flights, which in turn requires more
airplanes than would be required if there were an immediate return to
an open market system, or at least it is so argued." A lot of these "excess"
airplanes are not paid for; they are owned, directly or indirectly, by a
lot of big banks.
I do not wish to modify, or even to hear about, your big-bank-
sympathy quotient. I am saying that the existence of particular regula-
tory schemes may raise problems that at least appear to be different from
those raised by the question of whether or not to start down this road in
the first place. There may well be short term dislocations. These will
probably worsen in proportion to the extent to which the particular
regulatory scheme has moved resources away from their most valuable
uses. For this reason, these regulatory schemes should be the first to go.
Economic analysis tells us that we could pay all the short-term
(private) "losses" that would result from these dislocations out of the
efficiency gains from deregulation and have a good bit left over. One of
the real challenges of the deregulation effort is to figure out sensible in-
stitutional arrangements to do this (assuming that you are not willing
to let the chips fall where they may as a result of total and instant de-
regulation, which is by no means an obvious proposition). I believe
that it is fear of these possible short-term dislocations, as well as political
opposition from those who would be likely to suffer private losses, that
21D DourAs & J. MLmER, Ecomiuc RwOITION oF Domsric Am TRANsPoRT
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leads to regulatory "reform" rather than to outright abolition of agen-
cies such as ICC, CAB, FCC (and for the sake of provoking an interest-
ing discussion, FPC as well), all of which richly deserve that fate. But
for many reasons, I do not have great hope for the success of "reform"
in this area. I suspect that we would all be better off if we opted for
instant deregulation and either let the chips fall where they may or
figured out some way to payoff those who would be seriously injured
by the short-term adjustments that would be involved. But therein lies
the subject of another discussion.
